INTRODUCTION
In September 1978, Judge Richard H.C. Taylor of the Circuit Court of Hanover County, Virginia faced a dilemma.
2 He was about to preside over a highly publicized murder trial that had already resulted in three mistrials. 3 The judge was concerned that further publicity of the proceedings-or even the pres ence of the public inside the small, historic courtroom where the case would be tried-might spoil the case for a fourth time. 4 With the consent of both parties, he closed the courthouse doors to the public for the duration of the trial. 5 This courthouse held special significance in American history. In that same courthouse, more than two centuries earlier, Patrick Henry stated that King George had "degenerated into a Tyrant." 6 Arguing the case that became known as the "Parson's Cause," Henry successfully challenged the crown's authority to override the law of the colonies, which helped stoke the flames of the American Revolution. 7 One famous depiction of his oral argument shows an overflow crowd peering in through open doors.
The fees have persisted for decades, even though Congress intended for the Judiciary to move away from user fees to a "structure in which this information is freely available to the greatest extent possible." 21 This Note argues that the Judiciary has erected a fee structure that forecloses essential democratic ends because the fees make public federal court records practically inaccessible. The per-page fee model inhibits constitutionally pro tected activities without promoting equally transcendent ends. Through this fee system, the Judiciary collects fees at ever-increasing rates and uses much of the revenue for entirely different purposes. In this era, the actual cost of storing and transmitting digital records approaches zero. 22 Hence, PACER should be free. This Note examines the public's interest in free electronic access to federal court records and considers the relative strength of legal and policy arguments to the contrary. Part I performs an accounting of the true costs of a free-access re gime. Part II details the benefits of free electronic access to federal court records. Part III argues that, in the tradition of Richmond Newspapers, free access to elec tronic court records is a constitutionally necessary element of the structure of our 15 ( "Information delivered over a network in digital form exhibits the firstcopy problem in an extreme way: once the first copy of the information has been produced, additional copies cost essentially nothing.").
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I. THE COSTS OF PUBLIC ACCESS
Well into the 1980s, federal courts only maintained records in paper format. 24 See Electronic Public Access at 10, THIRD BRANCH, Sept. 2000, at 3, 3-4, https://archive.org/ details/thirdbranch32332200001fede [https://perma.cc/J752-AR3V].
However, burgeoning digital technologies promised to make case management and access to records by parties considerably more efficient. As courts transi tioned to digital filing systems over the following decade, the Internet presented an opportunity to fulfill traditional mandates of public access by using the web. In 2000, the official newsletter of the Judiciary proclaimed that it was possible to "surf to the courthouse door on the Internet." 26 However, this promise was not entirely recognized, and it remains unfulfilled to the present day. Whereas any individual who physically walks into a court house door can review all records for free, PACER imposes a fee for the same access. 27 Indeed, public access at federal courthouses is provided via computer terminals that simply connect to the public-facing PACER website. The terminals in each court clerk's office provide access only to documents filed in that specific court. The terminals do not permit the individual to save any documents. Printing documents costs $0.10 per page. See Find a Case (PACER), ADMIN OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/court-records/find-case-pacer [https://perma.cc/CW82-KQRJ].
Fees for digital access originated in the Judiciary Appropriations Act for 1991, which stated that the Judiciary "shall prescribe reasonable fees . . . to reim burse expenses incurred in providing [such] services." 28 These fees are determined by the Judicial Conference of the United States, 29 which is the policy-making body of the Judiciary. 30 The Judicial Conference oversees the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, which implements and manages the PACER system. 31 As discussed at more length in Part III, PACER is in fact little more than a public interface to the Judiciary's electronic Case Management and Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) system. The CM/ECF system exists first and foremost to serve the needs of judges and litigants-to "enhanc[e] the administration of justice by speeding up the processing of cases." Although the CM/ECF is driven by the needs of judges and litigants, it has always been 23. Although there has been considerable academic commentary on the legacy of Richmond Newspapers with respect to sealing practice, see generally Ardia, supra note 15, little attention has been paid to PACER and fee barriers to electronic records. 24.
25.
26. Electronic Public Access at 10, supra note 24, at 3. 27. Greater public access can, of course, affect privacy interests of those involved in litigation. 34 Although longstanding doctrines dictate that judicial proceedings should be available to all, courts have made tailored exceptions when the cost to privacy outweighs the value of public access. Record sealing and other practices have attracted renewed attention as electronic systems have lowered the barrier to access.
35
Two years after the Judiciary declared that the public could "surf to the courthouse door," Congress recognized that fees were standing in the way of meaningful public access. In passing the E-Government Act of 2002, Congress noted its intent that the Judiciary "move from a fee structure in which elec tronic docketing systems are supported primarily by user fees to a fee structure in which this information is freely available to the greatest extent possible."
36
It amended the law, changing the fee mandate from "shall" proscribe reasona ble fees to "may, only to the extent necessary." 37 In explaining the change, Congress described the problem it sought to remedy: "Pursuant to existing law, users of PACER are charged fees that are higher than the marginal cost of dis seminating the information." 38 S. REP NO. 107-174, at 23 (2002). The federal courts occasionally publish limited information about PACER's user base. They have noted that the users are "diverse" and that many of them are commercial users. U.S. COURTS, ELECTRONIC PUBLIC ACCESS PROGRAM SUMMARY 5 (2012), https:// www.pacer.gov/documents/epasum2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A57-WTPV] ("PACER has a diverse user population, including: lawyers; pro se filers; government agencies; trustees; bulk collectors; researchers; educational institutions; commercial enterprises; financial institutions; the media; and the general public."); see Financial Services and General Government Appropriations for 2018 (Part 2): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov't Appropriations of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 115th Cong. 605 (2018) ("The vast majority of PACER revenue (approximately eighty five percent) is attributable to less than three percent of 'power-users,' which are, for the most part, financial institutions or other major commercial enterprises that collect massive amounts of data for aggregation and resale.").
A. THE MARGINAL COST OF DISSEMINATING THE INFORMATION
The Judiciary lauds the PACER system as a fiscal success because it has never required appropriated funds. 39 Members of Congress have nevertheless observed a troubling trend: PACER fees far exceed the actual cost of providing electronic 33 . In 2009, the Judiciary began development of the "next generation" CM/ECF system. See id. That effort is incomplete and over budget, due in part to "serious management issues that have adversely affected the project and pose a serious risk to its eventual completion." John Brinkema & J. Michael Greenwood, E-Filing Case Management Services in the US Federal Courts: The Next Generation: A Case Study, INT'L J. FOR The Judiciary then began to spend these excess fees on programs that were unrelated to the expenses incurred in providing public access to records-and that were undoubtedly beyond the marginal cost of disseminating the public records. Other serv ices, such as the "Electronic Bankruptcy Noticing" system that notifies potential debtors of bankruptcy filings, seem entirely removed from PACER. In its defense, the Judicial Conference claimed that it was their policy to set PACER fees "commensurate with the costs of providing and enhancing services related to public access." Under this view, so long as an expense is somehow related to public access, it is permissible. Upon receipt of the Judicial Conference's letter, Senator Lieberman alerted the appropriators that PACER fees were being "used for initiatives that are unrelated to providing public access via PACER and against the requirement of the E-Government Act." This demonstrates a chasm between the Judicial Conference's interpretation of the law and the understanding of the law by its sponsor.
There are at least two ways of calculating the fiscal cost of free public access to electronic federal court records. On the one hand, one might consider the loss of all annual revenue from PACER. In 2016, PACER revenue was $150,814,000.
51
On the other hand, a calculation of fiscal cost might be limited to the actual mar ginal cost of disseminating the information. This technique focuses on true costs as opposed to the relative budgetary impact of terminating today's freewheeling PACER fees.
Even if one were to assume that all "Public Access Services" expenditures go toward actual PACER costs-a generous assumption-the scale of claimed costs is at odds with reality. The Judiciary claims to have spent $23,872,000 on this line item in 2016. 52 In the quarter century since PACER was created, the cost of storing and transmitting data has approached zero. This incongruity was thrown into sharp relief in February of 2017, when the Internet Archive, a nonprofit, offered to host all current and future PACER content for free, forever. The offer emphasized that the Internet Archive would maintain the PACER collection at no cost to the government and that it would provide unrestricted access for all members of the public. 56 The Internet Archive would build and maintain this collection by "crawling" the PACER web interface using software that it had already developed. 57 This free archiving and host ing service would require no action on the part of the Judiciary other than to forego billing on the one PACER account used by the Internet Archive. 58 The issue of how much the Judiciary is authorized to charge under the E-Government Act came to a head in National Veterans Legal Services Program v. United States, a class action on behalf of all PACER users that seeks repayment of charges that exceeded statutory authority. The class has been certified and notified, and the case has proceeded to the merits stage. The statutory claim in that case, however, merely seeks to align total user fees with actual fiscal cost. Though the result may be reduced PACER fees, the fees presumably would not be eliminated entirely. This Note's constitutional argument about PACER fees counsels against user fees altogether. 58. Letter from Brewster Kahle, supra note 55. Whether the Internet Archive's offer would be palatable to the Judiciary, it demonstrates the alarming disparity between PACER fees and the marginal cost of disseminating the information. Furthermore, experts have estimated that the marginal cost to the Judiciary of running a similar system itself-that is, without any partner such as the Internet Archivewould be less than a quarter of a million dollars annually. Nevertheless, Judge Tunheim said, "it is important to have our files accessible. I really do not want to see a sit uation in which plea agreements are routinely sealed or kept out of the electronic record." 65 The emergence of websites like whosarat.com highlights that elec tronic access to public records might have deleterious impacts on privacy and jus tice that physical access does not.
DOJ has previously used the term "practical obscurity" to describe print-era barriers to access to sensitive criminal information. 66 In the 1989 case United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, DOJ opposed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for a criminal "rap sheet." 67 A rap sheet consist of a digital compilation of information about an indi vidual, gleaned from a variety of sources and databases nationwide.
68 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, agreed with DOJ that there was an interest in practical obscurity: " [T] here is a vast difference between the public records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of information." 69 The Court decided that-at least in the context of a FOIA request for an internal government compilation that included public records-the privacy harms of upsetting practical obscurity out weighed the public interest in access. He noted that, although fees might discourage "the casual Internet surfer," data resellers were already making the same docu ments easily accessible. 73 Any measures to address privacy concerns would likely involve whether records were available electronically at all-not how much access would cost.
The Judicial Conference undertook an internal study and solicited comments from the public. The result was a privacy policy establishing the principle that records would be just as accessible via PACER as they are at a courthouse. 75 See generally JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON No doubt, there are costs-monetary and privacy-associated with public access to electronic records. The Judiciary emphasizes monetary costs even as the true cost of providing records approaches zero. The Judiciary appears to have acknowledged that recreating practical obscurity is impossible and has taken measures to minimize the amount of private information that is placed into elec tronic court records in the first place. It has rightly concluded that once a docu ment is available electronically, it is futile to attempt to control its dissemination. The Judiciary would be wise to work with privacy-minded members of the public to further improve the quality of prepublication privacy screening. 86 On balance, 81. The rules do allow parties to approximate the print era level of practical obscurity on a per document basis. Each set of rules makes available a protective order for "cause" that will "limit or prohibit a nonparty's remote electronic access to a document filed with the court." FED. R. BANKR. P. 9037(d); FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(e); FED. R. CRIM. P. 49.1(e); see also FED. R. APP. P. 25(a)(5) (stating that privacy protection is governed by the lower court rule on appeal the costs of public access to electronic court records should be small and ever decreasing.
II. THE BENEFITS OF PUBLIC ACCESS
Public access to the records of court proceedings serves at least two goals that are vital to democratic governance: to inform the public's understanding of the law as it is practiced and to check government power through transparency. 87 The first section of this Part describes how electronic access enhances public under standing of the law by making it "practically accessible" and by facilitating mod ern court reporting. 88 The second section shows how electronic court records improve transparency-enabling "big data" approaches to research and investi gative reporting and ensuring the archival preservation of the record. In early America, proceedings of the county court were a community affair.
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Courts convened only occasionally, and "court day" was an opportunity for the 87. For a particularly comprehensive review of how these themes are woven into First Amendment jurisprudence on court transparency, see Ardia, supra note 15, at 889-906.
88. I use the term "practical accessibility" to refer to modes of access that track with contemporary capabilities and create no greater barrier than necessary given pragmatic limitations. This stands in contrast to access that merely emulates outdated physical-world mechanisms or that imposes hurdles that are out of step with current technology.
89. Indeed, these twin aims-public understanding and government transparency-are at least as old as English common law and have been understood as essential bulwarks against judicial tyranny. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 414-15 n.3 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (cataloguing explicit public trial guarantees at both federal and state levels from early days of the republic); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948) (stating that a public trial serves "as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution"). The English Star Chamber, abolished in 1641, served as a visceral reminder to American colonists that justice must be administered in the open. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 266 ("[W]e have been unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this country. Nor have we found any record of even one such secret criminal trial in England since abolition of the Court of Star Chamber in 1641 . . . ." (footnotes omitted)); Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1917) ("The [right to public trial] is one of the important safeguards that were soon deemed necessary to round out the Constitution, and it was due to the historical warnings of the evil practice of the Star Chamber in England."). Open access has long served to promote not only the fair application of the law but also public perception that the courts are achieving just ends. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (observing that public access "gave assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned"); see also id. at 593-94 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that such access reinforces "a fair and accurate adjudication" and that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice" (quoting Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960))).
90. LOUNSBURY, supra note 6, at 3-8.
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THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 106:1197 public to witness justice in action. 91 Citizens from nearby towns would come to gether to socialize, sell their wares, play games, drink in the tavern, and, occa sionally to settle disputes by fighting in the streets. 92 Justice was dispensed in a more civilized fashion once the town crier announced that court would com mence. 93 Many members of the public would come into the courthouse to watch the proceedings regardless of whether they had business before the court. 94 In the words of the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers, court day could rightly be viewed as "an opportunity both for understanding the system in general and its workings in a particular case." 95 1. Practical Accessibility Early courthouses were located wherever they would be most accessible for citizens of the county. In an era in which citizens had to travel to the courthouse to witness or participate in the proceedings, the courthouse was typically erected at a crossroads in the center of the county. Today, details about proceedings in Hanover County are available for free from a state wide web database. Whereas the physical world often made court proceedings practically obscure, digital technologies present new opportunities for making proceedings "practi cally accessible." The same accessibility principle that motivated the placement of colonial courthouses should also guide decisions about digital court records. Electronic access should provide the most practical access possible given current technology and recordkeeping. Several strands of constitutional jurisprudence reinforce the principle that neither policies nor fees should artificially create bar riers to essential democratic processes.
In 1993, The Boston Globe's "Spotlight" investigative reporting team sought access to an index of all criminal offenders and associated case records main tained by Massachusetts courts. 99 The Commonwealth courts had previously refused to grant access to this index to members of the public, noting that the reporters were free to review individual case records at the courthouse. 100 The Globe argued that its reporters could not conduct their investigation without the 102 In Globe v. Fenton, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts concluded that without the index, "a reader is left with out a meaningful mechanism by which to find the documents necessary to learn what actually transpired in the courts."
103 It was not enough that access be theo retically possible. The court instead considered the "practical effectiveness" of the access that was actually provided. 104 Cases regarding indigent parties' access to court records and filing fees reflect a similar emphasis on practical effectiveness. For example, the Court noted in Bounds v. Smith that access to the courts must be "adequate, effective, and mean ingful" and found that prisoners' access was meaningful only if they had free access to trial records and other legal materials. 105 The Court also held that the "fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts" required courts to bear the cost of lost fee revenue. 106 As an additional protection, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pro vides the basis for requesting a fee waiver in forma pauperis in a criminal or civil matter, which is "designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts."
107 One can imagine a filing fee so high that all but the wealthiest entities are left without meaningful access.
When it comes to another fundamentally democratic activity-voting-the Supreme Court has held that any fee is unconstitutional. Because the electorate has diverse financial means, the Court held in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections that poll taxes categorically violate equal protection by imposing bar riers on access to the ballot box. 108 When the fees in question implicate access to a basic democratic activity, the Court will apply a high standard. Under the Harper standard, fees that limit effective participation of certain classes of citi zens are constitutionally impermissible. 109 A fee imposed at the door of the Supreme Court would be similarly odious because of the limitation it would impose on access to the Court. 104. See id. The Commonwealth also argued that by providing limited access under a burdensome and fee-laden "clearance" process for querying the index, it had satisfied all legal requirements for public access. Id. at 90-91. The court held that this clearance process actually reinforced barriers to public access and that the purported privacy interests in maintaining the regime were outweighed by the public right of access. Henry Wheaton was the first paid reporter for the Court. 113 Wheaton was succeeded by Richard Peters, who began to sell-at a lower price-abbreviated versions of Wheaton's own reports. 114 Wheaton claimed a violation of his copyright, and the Supreme Court held that no re porter may hold copyright in written opinions of the Court. 115 This constitu tional precedent has been applied to all court records 116 and is reinforced by 17 U.S.C. § 105, which bars copyright in government works. 117 Thus, both the courts and Congress have recognized that court documents are to be publicly available and that no entity may claim a right to restrict the public's right of access.
As the Court noted in Richmond Newspapers, "[i]nstead of acquiring informa tion about trials by firsthand observation or by word of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the print and electronic media."
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The Supreme Court publishes the following online, for free: transcripts of the oral arguments the same day they are argued, slip opinions within minutes of their issuance, and electronic versions of the official reporter of decisions dating back more than a quarter century. 119 See Information About Opinions, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/info_opinions.aspx [https://perma.cc/29EC-XQKJ]; Oral Arguments, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/oral_arguments.aspx [https://perma.cc/BJ89-WEJ4].
As the Court recently transitioned to electronic fil ing by parties, it announced that going forward it would make all records in every 110. It is outside the scope of this Note to delve deeply into these constitutional sources. The most authoritative review of the Richmond-based line of reasoning is Ardia, supra note 15.
111. The written record of the argument and decision in Parson's Cause consists primarily of a letter from the plaintiff, which was later compiled by a family member and published as part of a memoir. This is consistent with a principle of access that tracks technological progress, offering free access by the most practical contem porary method.
The federal district, bankruptcy, and appellate courts are out of step with the Supreme Court when it comes to electronic access. PACER stands in stark con trast to the near-instantaneous, free, electronic access to Supreme Court records. The important work of reporting on cases as they proceed is made difficult because PACER imposes a fee for every page of every search, docket report, and document downloaded. PACER provides no meaningful mechanism for non parties to receive notice of new activity on a given case, and it is often impossible to determine in advance how much the results of a search will cost. 122 See U.S. COURTS: PACER, https://www.pacer.gov [https://perma.cc/H9S2-SXLN] ("The cost to access a single document is capped at $3.00, the equivalent of 30 pages. The cap does not apply to name searches, reports that are not case-specific, and transcripts of federal court proceedings."). There are some exceptions to the rule that non-parties cannot receive notice of new case activity. For example, a handful of districts allow members of the media to do so. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. & BANKR. COURTS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, MEDIA USER GUIDE: ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC COURT RECORDS 2 (2013), http://www.dcd. uscourts.gov/sites/dcd/files/Media2013FILL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RNZ-N78M]. Some courts provide an RSS feed-a machine-readable list-of all new case activity in that court for the last day or so. Although the PACER site bills this as "Automated Case Notification," this firehose-style feed of every action in every case is not usable for most users, who do not know what RSS is, let alone how to meaningfully parse the feed. Even if a user were able to monitor this feed for relevant actions in a particular case, they would have to pay a fee to access the actual documents. See Automated Case Notification, U.S. COURTS: PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/announcements/general/rssnews.html [https://perma.cc/676L-LW5T].
The PACER fee policy provides a fee waiver mechanism that offers little relief for would-be reporters-both reporters of decisions and members of the press. As a threshold matter, the policy dictates that waivers should not be given to "members of the media."
123 Even if individuals surmount this hurdle, the policy states that they "must not transfer any data obtained"-that is, they may not re-publish the public court records they have obtained. 124 In any event, the fee waiver is at the discretion of each individual court and "may be revoked at the discretion of the court."
125 Taken together, this burdensome regime is akin to the restrictions that the Spotlight team faced in Globe v. Fenton. Many of the benefits of electronic access to court records are erased by the fee policy. Commentators will often begin and end their discussion of the value of govern ment transparency with Justice Brandeis's famous observation that "[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."
126
With respect to the courts in particular, Chief Justice Stone stated, "the only protection against unwise decisions, and even judicial usurpation, is careful scrutiny of their action and fearless comment upon it."
127 There is no doubt that these wise jurists perceived the true value of transparency as a bulwark against tyranny and corruption. However, these are not the only benefits of free and open access to electronic court records. The first subsection that follows discusses how digital records afford the opportunity to not only detect specific injustices, but also to understand larger "big data" trends within the Judiciary and society as a whole. The second subsection explains how free and open access would also help to ensure that court records are widely disseminated and securely archived.
Big Data and Investigative Journalism
"Big data" has become the catchphrase for computer-powered analysis of large information sets. Harnessing the power of big data-and protecting against its harms-was a signature issue for the Obama Administration. In one report, the Administration described how big data approaches could help detect bias in the criminal justice system. The order stated that government data should be "released to the public in ways that make the data easy to find, accessible, and usable." Justia is a company that publishes a variety of legal materials online for free. The State of Oregon claimed that Justia was violating its copyright by publishing the Oregon Revised Statutes. Justia and Public. Resource.Org disputed the State's claim, arguing that the statutes were not and should not be copyrighted. 136 The State of Oregon's Legislative Counsel Committee held a hearing to reconsider its position. The Judiciary has taken a different approach with PACER, making it impossi ble for academics, journalists, and the public in general to realize big data benefits of these court records. For example, UCLA Law Professor Lynn LoPucki obtained a temporary fee waiver from one bankruptcy court to conduct research. 140 After publishing research critical of the court, he was denied a subse quent waiver.
141 Such waivers are granted at the discretion of each individual court, meaning that they are not only administratively burdensome to obtain and maintain-particularly when conducting nationwide research 142 One group of academic researchers managed to obtain time-limited fee waivers from most bankruptcy courts, which meant that they were perpetually seeking to renew fee waivers in fifty different jurisdictions-each court on its own schedule and exercising its own discretion. The academics were nevertheless able to publish results in books and prominent law journals. In 2012, the Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR), a 501(c)(3) nonprofit or ganization, was denied a fee waiver by the United States Court for the Northern District of California. CIR intended to research the effectiveness of the court's conflict-of-interest system for judges by studying a large sample of cases. The district court denied the petition on the ground that CIR was a "member [] of the media." 145 The PACER fee schedule explicitly prohibits members of the media and others from receiving fee waivers under the presumption that they "have the ability to pay the fee."
146 CIR appealed, but the Ninth Circuit held that the matter was an unreviewable administrative decision.
147
Many federal court records are not electronically accessible without charge, but there is still a robust community of "law and big data" researchers. Although their work on PACER records continues to be hampered by access limitations, they have demonstrated the potential of big data analytics for legal records in general. 145. See id. at 2-3. 146. ELECTRONIC PUBLIC ACCESS FEE SCHEDULE, supra note 20 ("Examples of individuals and groups that a court should not exempt include: local, state or federal government agencies, members of the media, privately paid attorneys or others who have the ability to pay the fee.").
147. 
Archival Fidelity and Permanence
In early America, the clerk's office was often the only place where important legal records were stored. 150 Paper records were somewhat haphazardly main tained and prone to destruction by fire, dampness, and rats. 151 This posed signifi cant risks not only for routine matters, such as determining land title, but also for the integrity of the fundamental common law principle of stare decisis. If the records of proceedings were destroyed, how would subsequent jurists apply the laws that they articulated? The problem became so significant that Virginia passed a law in 1792 that required construction of a fireproof clerk's office on the courthouse grounds in every county. However, what constitutes an "opinion" is left to the discretion of each judge. Some judges may not mark a final decision as an "opinion" at all, whereas others may mark every order as an "opinion." 161 In any event, docket sheets, full case metadata (including judge name), and party filings are not included in the GPO collection. These factors make the GPO service a poor substitute for direct PACER access that is woefully incomplete even on its own terms.
A solution could be for the Judiciary to permit a third party, such as the Internet Archive, to maintain an up-to-date copy of every document and docket sheet in PACER, which would preserve the corpus without restriction. For added protection, all PACER documents could be automatically digitally signed by the GPO before redistribution. Likeminded entities could make and redistribute copies, decreasing the likelihood that records would be lost to history. If the traditional model of deposit with NARA continues to falter, these measures would ensure that the record is preserved. This type of change in policy would, 158 . The technical architecture of the CM/ECF system that underlies PACER is evolving to a more centralized model as part of the "NextGen" initiative that the courts have been implementing for several years. See Brinkema & Greenwood, supra note 33, at 10. Under this model, courts continue to maintain operational control of their systems even though many components are managed by staff of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. See id. (noting that "[a]lthough the concept of centralization had been suggested to the courts before, the courts had vigorously rejected the idea; however, severe budget crises have since forced them to reconsider").
159.
160.
161. See Martin, supra note 121, at 17-18; see also Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16 NEV. L.J. 515, 530-531 (2016) (describing how a large portion of reasoned opinions are not marked as such, and arguing that their absence from most electronic databases represents a failure to satisfy the mandate of the E-Government Act).
162. The structures that governments build for administering justice reflect and rein force fundamental beliefs about what the law is and how it should be practiced. 165 The architecture of judicial bureaucracy includes not only physical courthouses, but also the judicial apparatus as a whole. When courts create new structures, they may decide to incorporate core values into the design of those structures, whereas other principles may fall by the wayside. What appear to be administra tive decisions may be profoundly substantive. 166 The first section of this Part dis cusses the role that public access played in the construction of both the famous Hanover County Courthouse and the design of PACER. The second section argues that the timeless principles reflected in Richmond Newspapers call for free public access to electronic court records.
A. FROM TAVERN TO WEB: THE INTERNET AS AMERICA'S COURTHOUSE 167 At first, county court was held in taverns or meetinghouses. 168 There were no specialized buildings, so public proceedings transpired in the same place as many other public affairs. For example, some buildings in Massachusetts were outfitted with temporary trappings of government, put in place when the court convened and removed once its business was complete. 169 There was little delineation between the public sphere and the space of the court.
In the eighteenth century, lawyering emerged as a profession and courthouses became permanent purpose-built structures. 170 Massachusetts courts formally recognized the profession of "attorney," and these new attorneys created their own associations to distinguish themselves from mere "pettifoggers. 166. These principles manifest in "the pattern and interplay in the governmental edifice that the Constitution describes and creates, and in the institutions and practices it propels." Laurence H. The term pettifogger itself alludes to devious and disreputable mercantile practices. Though its ori gin is obscure, fogger probably derives from Fugger, the name of an Augsburg merchant family in THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 106:1197 proceedings is indeed implicit in the Constitution. The relevant "past decisions" include not only formal judicial decisions, but also administrative decisions dat ing back to the embryonic stage of our republic. 220 The Court appropriately strug gled with where to locate the right of access, leaning on history as a guide. The right to maximum public access both inheres in the structure of our system of jus tice and reinforces that structure. It is manifest in the physical, virtual, and doctri nal structures that we create.
CONCLUSION
PACER lags behind not only modern commercial technology but also the courts' own information technology systems. Parties and jurists have already real ized many benefits of Internet-connected digital technology in federal courtsoutpacing PACER users who are hampered by burdensome fees.
The monetary costs of offering PACER for free to the public should be negligi ble in comparison to what the Judiciary claims, and the current cross-subsidiza tion scheme is likely illegal. There is no doubt that the Judiciary would have to make up for millions in lost annual revenue from PACER if they stopped charg ing for access. However, the lost revenue would be a small percentage of the Judiciary's budget that could be offset by justifiable fees on litigants or could be legitimately requested from appropriators. The privacy costs of digital court records are already present in the current fee-based regime, and the Judiciary has spent more than a decade remedying them. Furthermore, free public access would allow privacy-minded individuals to develop solutions.
The benefits of free public access to PACER are manifold. Free access would improve the public's understanding of the law as it is practiced and would increase the transparency of the courts. Court records would be practically acces sible in a way that comports with twenty-first century practice. Reporters would have the raw materials of democratic justice at their fingertips. The courts would recapture some of the transparency that existed in an era when "court day" was a community event rather than a cloistered and esoteric exercise by specialists. "Big data" technology would help researchers and journalists separate the forest from the trees, identify and inform structural features of the Judiciary, and engen der a feeling among the public that the courts are legitimate and accountable. The records of American law, as practiced in the courts, would be reliably archived and widely disseminated.
Still, a pure cost-benefit approach to analyzing PACER fees can overlook the fundamental nature of the rights at hand. The Court in Richmond Newspapers highlighted the paramount importance of a maximally open Judiciary, reciting Jeremy Bentham's declaration that "[w]ithout publicity, all other checks are insufficient." 221 We should not overlook the intrinsic right of public access to
